The paper studies bilateral contracting with endogenous property rights. Players engage in costly ex post adjustment of ex ante contract. After ex ante agreement on surplus sharing, players invest irreversibly production. Player costs of altering ex ante contract are transaction costs of three kinds: measurement, information and enforcement costs. Each player chooses an action which incurs transaction costs and influences the actual ex post surplus sharing. When one player chooses the ex ante contract, each player's equilibrium share increases in his productivity and transaction cost parameters. We address how player investment incentives depend on the interplay between the transaction costs.
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Introduction
Economic theory describes economic environments by production functions, utility functions, and constraints.
1 The transaction environment is usually modelled as a constraint. Instead, we model the transaction environment as a separate function, rather than merely as a constraint. Recognising the work of North (1990, pp.28-30) , we account for three kinds of transaction costs; measurement, information and enforcement costs. Three functions rather than one reflect reality more appropriately, and make our model more applicable to work with actual data. For each player we include three transaction parameters to reflect the three kinds of players' transaction costs.
Our justification for different functions for production and transaction costs is that these proceed according to different logics. Production, and especially its technological part, propagates fast, and at similar rates across the globe. In contrast, transaction costs do not. There are cultural differences across continents, and it takes time to change legal systems and societal attitudes to favouritism, corruption, bribery, etc. In this manner our model helps explaining differences in cross-country productivities, e.g., due to production being costlier in countries with lower wages, and due to different transaction costs.
Although players could incur transaction costs ex ante, in this model we do not consider such costs. With investment irreversibility, the players' ex post transaction costs cannot be modelled via inclusion into the production function. Thus, we suggest to model transaction decisions separately from the investment decisions. A first step in this direction is made by Hausken and Schwartz (2011) . They model iceberg costs as a transaction cost function which increases exponentially in an action chosen by each player, and estimate how much the players' joint ex post shares shrink in terms of their transaction constants and production. North (1990) argues that any joint production entails two distinct types of costs -transformation costs and transaction costs.
We consider a three period game between two players. The players are fully informed about the structure of the game and all parameters. In the first period, ex ante, the contract specifying surplus sharing is signed. In the second period, irreversible investment into production occurs. Ex ante contract can be altered ex post. That is, in the third period players can extend resources to alter the surplus sharing. Thus, ex post surplus division is endogenously determined. We introduce two versions of transaction costs, in the first version only player parameters are present. In the second version, we have separate parameters to characterise the overall transaction environment and player specific capabilities in this environment.
We distinguish between productive investments and actions to alter surplus sharing since this distinction is common within most firms, for example in terms of competence among employees and budgetary allocations. It is thus natural that these are two different free choice variables. Absent costly actions the model is equivalent to a standard moral hazard in teams model (Holmstrøm, 1979) . The tradeoffs in such a model are well known. Allocating a player a greater share of the surplus will increase his investment incentives and will increase total surplus, which may benefit other players. Absent investments, the model with just costly actions is equivalent to a standard rent-seeking model (Tullock, 1980) which also has well-known properties.
After production in the second period, the players in the third period choose actions which can be interpreted as rent-seeking. See Tullock (1980) for an early formulation when the rent is fixed, Skaperdas (1992) for tradeoffs between productive and coercive activities, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Hausken (2005) for production and rent seeking, Murphy et al. (1993) for why rent seeking is costly to growth, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) for tradeoffs between providing incentives and reducing ex post transaction costs due to costly renegotiation, and Muthoo (2004) for the emergence of secure property rights through production and rent seeking. Further, Hacket (1994) and Oosterbeek et al. (2003) find that players who invest relatively more tend to receive larger shares of ex-post surplus, and Hausken and Schwartz (2011) model the transactional environment as a separate function, rather than merely as a constraint. This paper proceeds beyond this literature by considering the third rent seeking period as an alteration of an ex ante contract determined in the first period. Our analysis employs specific and credible functional forms to generate analytic solutions and numerical simulations that illuminate the players' decisions. In return for the sacrifice of generality, a successful specification demonstrates that at least the minimal standard of internal consistency has been achieved.
2
Property rights theory, also referred to as the incomplete contracting literature, has been one common approach to analyse contracting. It has been successful, but also has limitations.
3 It makes four assumptions:
1 ex ante contracts are not enforceable ex post 2 ex ante the players can give and accept lump-sum transfers 3 the players engage in ex post Nash bargaining 4 players have ex post 'outside options', which differ with ownership structure.
This paper presents an alternative model which remedies the limitations while preserving the successful sides. We replace the conventional assumptions with three alternative assumptions, applicable particularly for incomplete, and poorly enforceable ex ante contracts.
1 only a primitive ex ante contract specifying player shares is viable 2 player investments are irreversible 3 ex ante contract could be altered ex post at exogenous cost(s).
We account for two characteristics of existing business contracts. The first is that ex ante contracts between the players specify only the shares of joint production. One example is sharecropping contracts in the agricultural sector which determine the division of product between tenants and landlords according to some predetermined share-out. 4 On the one hand, this reflects that players often have limited capabilities of elaborate ex ante contracting, and on the other hand reflects that agreements specifying how joint production is shared is often a routine contractual practice. The second is ex post adjustment of ex ante agreement, which is also common in contractual interactions. See Klein (1985) for an account of the flexibility present in contracts that govern real world business relationships, where ex post adjustment is often easy to the extent that possible contingencies that may arise ex post may have limited ex ante allocative significance. See Reuer et al. (2002) for the occurrence and determinants of post-formation governance changes in strategic alliances, including alterations in alliances' contracts, boards or oversight committees, and monitoring mechanisms. We account for the cost to the players of verifying and enforcing their contracts ex post. For example, for the internet economy, information and measurement costs are low, whereas enforcement costs are high.
Many possibilities exist for determining ex ante sharing. We do not think a general method can be provided for determining ex ante sharing, and leave it to future research to explore the many possibilities. Any method chosen is compatible with this paper's model as long as ex ante sharing is somehow determined. In this paper we assume that ex ante sharing is chosen by one of the players. This is realistic in markets with one dominant player 5 , or in markets where the players are willing to let one player choose the ex ante sharing. Further methods that can be explored in future research are to let ex ante sharing be chosen by bargaining, e.g., Nash bargaining, by a social planner, or by various characteristics of the players, the environment, the production method, the product, or the user of the product.
Summing up, we argue that a model with the combination of investments and costly actions yield realism that investments or costly actions alone would not. First, accounting only for investments reduces the model to one which does not allow accounting for the emergence of unforeseen contingencies and how players adapt to these (Klein, 1985) . Second, accounting only for costly actions reduces the model to a rent seeking model which exogenises the rent and thus cannot account for production and investment.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves the model for two functional forms for the transaction costs. These are 'player focused transaction costs' and 'player and system focused transaction costs'. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We consider an interaction of two players. In the first period the ex ante contract specifying surplus sharing is signed. It gives a share x to player 1 and 1 -x to player 2. In the second period, each player invests q j irreversibly, j = 1, 2. The production function R(q 1 , q 2 ) depends on transformation investments q 1 and q 2 of each player. In the third period (ex post), the players choose three kinds of transaction actions which impact three kinds of transaction costs, to which we refer as measurement, information and enforcement costs. The measurement actions r m ≥ 0 and s m ≥ 0 impact measurement costs M 1 (r m ) and M 2 (s m ), information actions r i ≥ 0 and s i ≥ 0 impact information costs I 1 (r i ) and I 2 (s i ), and enforcement actions r e ≥ 0 and s e ≥ 0 impact enforcement costs E 1 (r e ) and E 2 (s e ). North (1990, p.28 ) distinguishes these costs as playing a role when 'defining, protecting and enforcing property rights for goods'. The actions r and s reflect the players' impact on ex post contract adjustment. Player ex post surplus sharing y is determined by ( ) = , where = , , , 0 , 1,
and player 1 and 2 shares are y and 1 -y. The ex ante share is between 0 and 1, and the players choose transaction actions in equilibrium which confine the ex post share to be between 0 and 1. For example, player 1 has no incentive to increase r t arbitrarily much since that is costly and player 1 can maximally earn an ex post share y = 1. The subscripts m, i, and e refer to measurement, information and enforcement actions, respectively. The intuition of (1) is that player 1's share increases if r m or r i or r e increases, while player 2's share increases if s m or s i or s e increases. We define = ,
which is the difference between transaction actions for players 1 and 2. We define
which has two interpretations. First, Δ is the sum of player 1's transaction actions minus the sum of player 2's transaction actions, which determines the players' impact on ex post contract adjustment. Second, Δ equals player 1 ex post surplus share minus his ex ante share. When r m + r i + r e = s m + s i + s e , cumulative transaction actions are equal for both players, and ex post sharing coincides with ex ante sharing, i.e., y = x and Δ = 0. Each player's objective is to maximise his profit. The profits are 
where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to players 1 and 2, and w j > 0 is player j's unit investment cost. We consider two versions of transaction costs. The first version is ( ) 
where β t ≥ 0 and γ t ≥ 0 are transaction parameters of players 1 and 2, respectively. With (5), we do not have separate parameters to characterise the overall transaction environment. Here the player parameters embed systemic properties of the environment. In contrast, the second version has separate systemic parameters ( ) 
where β 1,2,t ≥ 0 are player specific transaction parameters, and γ t ≥ 0 are system specific transaction parameters. With the separation of systemic parameters from player characteristics, the number of parameters increases from six in (5) to nine in (6). But these additional parameters permit us to isolate player and system impact. Observe from (5) and (6) that r t = 0 and s t = 0 cause zero transaction costs which expresses full commitment to ex ante sharing. The transaction costs increase exponentially as the transaction actions increase. We use the Cobb-Douglas production function ( )
where λ is a production parameter, α ∈ (0, 1) is introduced for normalisation convenience, and η ∈ (0, 1/2) is a player specific productivity parameter for player 1
Solving the model

Player focused transaction costs (5)
Inserting equations (1) and (5) into each player's profit in (4) gives 
We solve the third period first, after the players have chosen x in the first period and q 1 , q 2 in the second period so that R = R (q 1 , q 2 ) is realised already. Differentiating the profit with respect to the transaction investments and setting the derivatives equal to zero gives
which are solved to yield
and
Hence, optimal transaction actions depend only on R (q 1 , q 2 ) and the transaction cost parameters, and not on ex ante sharing x directly. Rewriting (10) as exponential functions and inserting into (5) gives
This means that the players' optimal transaction costs are proportional to the joint production R. The proportionality parameter equals the player's respective transaction parameters. Intuitively, the higher the production R, the higher the transaction cost each player is willing to incur. Also intuitively, the higher the transaction parameter, the higher is the optimal transaction cost the player incurs in equilibrium. If β t R ≤ 1 and γ t R ≤ 1 in (12), the agent will engage in no rent-seeking activities and so the transaction costs will be zero, which cause β t = 1 / R and γ t = 1 / R. Inserting into (10) yields r t = s t = 0, which according to (1) implies y = x, which expresses full commitment to the ex ante contract.
Hence we require β t ≥ 1 / R and γ t ≥ 1 / R which express lower limits to the transaction parameters. Inserting (12) into (4) 
In equation (13) the three transaction parameters for each player are subtracted from ex post sharing to determine the share of the production that each player earns. We then solve the second period. Assume that x is fixed. The Appendix shows that unique optimal transformation investments q 1 (x) and q 2 (x) exist when η ∈ (0, 1/2).
Inserting into (10) gives unique optimal transaction actions r t and s t as functions of x, and inserting into (10) gives unique optimal ex post sharing y = y(x). This proves that unique y(x), q 1 (x), q 2 (x), r t (x) and s t (x) exist. This uniqueness result means that y(x) is invertible which allows us to define the function q 1 (y) = q 1 (y(x)) and q 2 (y) = q 2 (y(x)), and hence we use y as independent variable instead of x. Next, we use the uniqueness result and assume that y is fixed, and differentiate the profit in (13) with respect to q 1 and q 2 to find optimal q 1 (y) and q 2 (y). We set the derivatives to zero, which gives 
which yields ( ) 
Inserting into (7) 
which is solved to yield R as a function of y only, 
with derivative
Inserting (17) and (12) 
Solving for the optimal y by differentiating the profits and equating the derivatives to zero gives 
Letting y j refer to player j's optimal ex post surplus sharing, and solving (20) gives
and 2 2 = (1 ) 1 , 0 1.
Notice that from our uniqueness result, by finding an optimal y j we effectively also receive optimal x j . The ex post shares y 1 and y 2 are incompatible and do not sum to one since the players have different preferences as to who shall determine ex ante sharing. Equations (21) and (22) thus specify the determination of ex post surplus sharing when one of the players, without loss of generality, determines ex ante sharing (reflecting our correspondence between ex ante and ex post sharing shown in the Appendix). Hereafter letting player 1, without loss of generality, determine ex ante sharing, inserting (21) into (17), (19), and (15) gives the production ( )
= (1 )(1 (1 )) 1 3, = (1 )(1 (1 )) 1 3,
and transformation investments ( )
(1 (1 )) 1 = , 
From (23), (24), (25) and (10), we require ( ) < 1,
which ensures that, in optimum, the production, profits, transformation investments, and transaction actions r t (y) and s t (y) are positive. Ex ante sharing x(y) follows from (1). The results when player 2 determines ex ante sharing are analogous. In particular, the production R when player 2 determines ex ante sharing follows from interchanging w 1 and w 2 in (23), and replacing η with 1 -η. Whereas we above have expressed lower limits β t ≥ 1 / R and γ t ≥ 1 / R, (26) expresses upper limits to β t and γ t . b The production R, profits Π 1 and Π 2 , and transformation investments q 1 and q 2 decrease in β t and γ t .
Proof. Follows from the first order conditions for (21) to (25).
Property 2: When player 1, without loss of generality, determines ex ante sharing, he earns a higher profit. Player 1' s profit minus player 2's profit is ( )
Proof. Follows from (24), α ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1/2).
Property 2 confirms the obvious fact that the player choosing the ex ante contract can always choose the same ex ante sharing as his opponent would have chosen, and thus assure himself at least that profit. contracting with, e.g., a developing country 2 where a given transformation investment q 2 incurs a ten times higher expenditure expressed with the cost w 2 q 2 in (4). This cost may be caused by poor organisation, inefficient utilisation of labour, or inadequate competence. The increased cost causes the joint production and both players' profits and transformation investment, and especially player 2's transformation investment, to decrease. r m increases more slowly, r i is lower, and x decreases more slowly. 
Player and system focused transaction costs (6)
Consider the third period subgame, with player actions x 1 , x 2 , q 1 , q 2 fixed. Then, R(q 1 , q 2 ) is fixed as well. We differentiate the profit with respect to r t and s t and set the derivatives equal to zero to find optimal actions r m (x 1 , x 2 , q 1 , q 2 ), s m (x 1 , x 2 , q 1 , q 2 ), etc. We simplify the notation and use R instead of R(q 1 , q 2 ) and r m , s m instead of r m (x 1 , x 2 , q 1 , q 2 ), s m (x 1 , x 2 , q 1 , q 2 ) etc. Inserting equations (1) and (6) into each player's profit in (4) and differentiating gives 
Equation ( 
From (31), in optimum, both players spend the same share γ of the production R on transaction costs, but different transaction parameters β are subtracted from γ t R. This means that the player with more costly ex post adjustment, as expressed with a higher β which signifies higher commitment, incurs lower transaction costs and chooses a lower transaction action as shown in (6) and (29). Lower transaction costs and lower transaction actions mean that the players are more satisfied with their ex ante sharing. This confirms our statement above that a higher β signifies higher player commitment to ex ante sharing. Analogously to the previous section, we require γ t ≥ β 1t / R and γ t ≥ β 2t / R to ensure non-negative transaction costs.
Inserting (31) into (4) 
which is similar to (13) except that β t is replaced with γ t and the constant 3 is replaced with the constant , 1, 2. 
Letting player 1 determine ex ante sharing, inserting (33) when replacing β t and γ t into (17), (32), and (15) gives the production ( )
and profits 1 1 2 2 = (1 )(1 (1 )) 1 2 , = (1 )(1 (1 )) 1 2 , 
From (35), (36), (37) and (29), we require 2 <1 ,
which ensures that, in optimum, the production, profits, transformation investments, and transaction actions r t (y) and s t (y) are positive. Ex ante sharing x(y) follows from (1). The results when player 2 determines ex ante sharing are analogous. In particular, the production R when player 2 determines ex ante sharing follows from interchanging w 1 and w 2 in (23), and replacing η with 1 -η. Whereas we above have expressed lower limits γ t ≥ β 1t / R and γ t ≥ β 2t / R, (38) expresses upper limits to γ t .
Property 3:
a Player 1's preferred equilibrium ex post share y 1 increases in γ t when 2α(1 -η) > 1.
Player 2's preferred share y 2 always increases in γ t . If (38) is satisfied, both y 1 and y 2 increase in η, and y 1 decreases in α, while y 2 increases in α.
b The production R, profits Π 1 and Π 2 , and transformation investments q 1 and q 2 , decrease in γ t .
Proof. Follows from the first order conditions for (33) to (37).
Property 4: When player 1, without loss of generality, determines ex ante sharing, player 1' s profit minus player 2's profit is ( )
Proof. Follows from (36), α ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1/2).
Whereas the first term on the right hand side of (39) is positive when production is positive, the second term can be arbitrarily much positive or negative dependent on β 1t and β 2t . Hence in contrast to Property 2, in Property 4 player 1 earns a lower profit than player 2 when β 1t is sufficiently much smaller than β 2t , despite determining ex ante sharing. Comparing Properties 2 and 4, observe how they are equivalent when 2 = ( ) (5), and player and system focused transaction costs (6), cause equal production in (23) and (35), and equal transformation investments in (25) (24) and (36) are also equal. The actions in (10) and (29) are equal when β t = γ t and β 1t = β 2t = 1, which also cause equal ex ante and ex post shares according to (1).
Proof. Follows from comparing the relevant equations in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Property 5 illustrates how the two versions of transaction costs can cause equivalent results, which also reveals how the two versions can cause different results. The version with player focused transaction costs approaches Coase's (1937 Coase's ( , 1988 result when β t and γ t approach zero. The version with player and system focused transaction costs approaches Coase's (1937) result when γ t approaches zero and β 1t and β 2t are similar.
Conclusions
We present a model of bilateral contracting with three kinds of transaction costs and endogenous property rights. We address how player investment incentives depend on the interplay between these different transaction costs which are measurement, information and enforcement costs. Ex ante agreed surplus sharing can be altered ex post, after irreversible investments in production (characterised by the generalised Cobb-Douglas production function). The actual surplus sharing is determined ex post, after each player has chosen a costly action to alter the surplus sharing in his favour, thus incurring transaction costs. We demonstrate that when one player chooses the ex ante contract, each player's equilibrium share increases in his productivity and transaction cost parameters. We consider two functional forms for the transaction costs. These are 'player focused transaction costs' and 'player and system focused transaction costs'. The model stands in contrast to property rights theory where ex ante contracts are not enforceable ex post. This paper studies contracting between players who produce jointly and share their surplus. We account for two characteristics of contracts. The first is that ex ante contracts between the players specify only the shares of joint production. The second is ex post adjustment of ex ante agreement. Furthermore, surplus sharing agreed upon ex ante can be altered ex post after irreversible investment into production. Costs of altering ownership allocation are player specific. We investigate the effects of player transaction costs on incentives and allocational efficiency. We allow costly ex post modification of ex ante contract, in contrast to classical property rights theory where firm organisation and technology are driven by ex ante efficiency.
A three period game with two players is considered with the generalised Cobb-Douglas production function and a transaction cost function which increases convexly in action, and decreases convexly in a player specific transaction cost parameter. Ex ante, in the first period, the players sign a contract specifying surplus sharing. In the second period the players invest irreversibly into production. Ex post, in the third period, the players choose actions which incur transaction costs to determine ex post ownership of surplus endogenously.
Assuming without loss of generality that one of the players proposes the ex ante contract for all players that is optimal for him, which is realistic in markets with one dominant player, we determine the optimal ex post contract. We show how the players' ex post shares, profits, transformation investments, actions, and production depend on the transaction parameters. With player focused transaction costs, the player determining ex ante sharing always earns a higher profit, whereas with player and system focused transaction costs, it may earn a lower profit since player specific and system specific parameters may be adjusted differently. We show when the two versions of transaction costs cause equivalent versus different results, and when they approach Coase's (1937) result.
Notes
1
Cheung (1998) lists three fundamental avenues for economic interpretations of observations: "First is manipulating the utility function (demand), second is manipulating the production function (supply), and third is manipulating the constraints". 2 Thus, we consider the Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns. In economics, Cobb-Douglas or CES production functions, although involving special assumptions about the functional relations between inputs and outputs, have proved to be extremely useful for advancing our understanding of productive processes and economic growth. Applying credible specific functional forms allows us to produce exact analytical solutions for the variables, illustrated with numerical simulations. In return for the sacrifice of generality, a successful specification demonstrates that at least the minimal standard of internal consistency has been achieved. In addition, we claim, the particular functional forms used here will be illuminating. Using particular functional forms makes it possible to determine ranges of parameter values, for example for when one player earns a larger ex post share than another player. 3
See Hart (1983, 1986 ), Hart and Moore (1990) , Whinston (2003) , Williamson (2002) . See also Hart (1995) , the special issue of Review of Economic Studies (1999, 66/226) , and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a recent review. 4
The tenant's share of output has been observed to be as low as 20% in Southern India [Tomlinson, (1996) , p.81] or as high as 80% in Argentina in the 1890s [Adelman, (1994) , p.137]. 5
Apple in the i-phone or i-pod markets (Linden et al., 2007) . 6
The ex post shares of players 1 and 2 are y and 1 -y, respectively, so we can differentiate both profits with respect to y as a free decision variable. 7
If (26) were not satisfied, it would be suboptimal to incur transaction costs. Then the players would be as if perfectly committed to ex ante surplus sharing. Equation (26) means that we do not consider such environments.
Appendix
Lemma 1: Let η ∈ (0, 1/2). Then, for each player, there exists a unique equilibrium in the subgame that starts from any fixed x.
Proof. We prove the Lemma for 'player focused transaction costs'. The proof for 'player and system focused transaction costs' is analogous. First, recall from (10) [and (29) ] that for given x, r t , s t there exist unique optimal r t = r t (x, q 1 , q 2 ) and s t = s t (x, q 1 , q 2 ) which depend on R = R(q 1 , q 2 ) only as r t = r t (⋅, q 1 , q 2 ) and s t = s t (⋅, q 1 , q 2 ). Thus, for any fixed x, y = y(x, r t , s t ) = y(⋅, q 1 , q 2 ) as determined by (1), which means that player j's objective function can be expressed as a function of q 1 and q 2 only. Consider player 1 without loss of generality. Inserting (10) into (1) and differentiating when x is fixed gives ( 
Next, we show that for any fixed x, each player i has a unique optimal investment. To prove this, we show that 
Differentiating (7) gives ( ) 
